[Guide] Finding Best Security Outsourcing Alternative For Your Organization

As cyberattacks continue to proliferate in volume and increase in sophistication, many organizations acknowledge that some part of their breach protection must be outsourced, introducing a million-dollar question of what type of service to choose form. Today, Cynet releases the Security Outsourcing Guide (download here), providing IT Security executives with clear and actionable guidance on

via The Hacker News

This article is the property of Tenochtitlan Offensive Security. Verlo Completo --> https://tenochtitlan-sec.blogspot.com

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APPLE IPHONE X FACE ID CAN BE HACKED WITH SILICON MASK

Just a week after Apple released its brand new iPhone X on November 3, a team of researchers has claimed to successfully hack Apple's Face ID facial recognition technology with a mask that costs less than $150. They said Apple iPhone x face id can be hacked with silicon mask easily.

apple iPhone x face id hacked
Yes, Apple's "ultra-secure" Face ID security for the iPhone X is not as secure as the company claimed during its launch event in September this year.

"Apple engineering teams have even gone and worked with professional mask makers and makeup artists in Hollywood to protect against these attempts to beat Face ID," Apple's senior VP of worldwide marketing Phil Schiller said about Face ID system during the event.

"These are actual masks used by the engineering team to train the neural network to protect against them in Face ID."

However, the bad news is that researchers from Vietnamese cybersecurity firm Bkav were able to unlock the iPhone X using a mask.

Yes, Bkav researchers have a better option than holding it up to your face while you sleep. Bkav researchers re-created the owner's face through a combination of 3D printed mask, makeup, and 2D images with some "special processing done on the cheeks and around the face, where there are large skin areas" and the nose is created from silicone.

The researchers have also published a proof-of-concept video, showing the brand-new iPhone X first being unlocked using the specially constructed mask, and then using the Bkav researcher's face, in just one go.

"Many people in the world have tried different kinds of masks but all failed. It is because we understand how AI of Face ID works and how to bypass it," an FAQ on the Bkav website said.

"You can try it out with your own iPhone X, the phone shall recognize you even when you cover a half of your face. It means the recognition mechanism is not as strict as you think, Apple seems to rely too much on Face ID's AI. We just need a half face to create the mask. It was even simpler than we ourselves had thought."

Researchers explain that their "proof-of-concept" demo took about five days after they got iPhone X on November 5th. They also said the demo was performed against one of their team member's face without training iPhone X to recognize any components of the mask.

"We used a popular 3D printer. The nose was made by a handmade artist. We use 2D printing for other parts (similar to how we tricked Face Recognition 9 years ago). The skin was also hand-made to trick Apple's AI," the firm said.

The security firm said it cost the company around $150 for parts (which did not include a 3D printer), though it did not specify how many attempts its researchers took them to bypass the security of Apple's Face ID.

It should be noted that creating such a mask to unlock someone's iPhone is a time-consuming process and it is not possible to hack into a random person's iPhone.

However, if you prefer privacy and security over convenience, we highly recommend you to use a passcode instead of fingerprint or Face ID to unlock your phone.

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OWASP-ZSC: A Shellcode/Obfuscate Customized Code Generating Tool

About OWASP-ZSC
   OWASP ZSC is open source software written in python which lets you generate customized shellcodes and convert scripts to an obfuscated script. This software can be run on Windows/Linux/OSX with Python 2 or 3.

   What is shellcode?: Shellcode is a small codes in Assembly language which could be used as the payload in software exploitation. Other usages are in malwares, bypassing antiviruses, obfuscated codes...

   You can read more about OWASP-ZSC in these link:

• OWASP ZSC Tool Project - OWASP
• Document: OWASP ZSC · GitBook (Legacy)
• Home page: OWASP ZSC | OWASP ZCR Shellcoder
• Features: OWASP ZSC | OWASP ZCR Shellocder Available Features
• Archive: ZCR-Shellcoder-Archive
• Mailing List: Google Groups
• API: api.z3r0d4y.com

Why use OWASP-ZSC?
   Another good reason for obfuscating files or generating shellcode with OWASP-ZSC is that it can be used during your pen-testing. Malicious hackers use these techniques to bypass anti-virus and load malicious files in systems they have hacked using customized shellcode generators. Anti-virus work with signatures in order to identify harmful files. When using very well known encoders such as msfvenom, files generated by this program might be already flagged by Anti-virus programs.

   Our purpose is not to provide a way to bypass anti-virus with malicious intentions, instead, we want to provide pen-testers a way to challenge the security provided by Anti-virus programs and Intrusion Detection systems during a pen test.In this way, they can verify the security just as a black-hat will do.

   According to other shellcode generators same as Metasploit tools and etc, OWASP-ZSC  using new encodes and methods which antiviruses won't detect. OWASP-ZSC encoders are able to generate shell codes with random encodes and that allows you to generate thousands of new dynamic shellcodes with the same job in just a second, that means, you will not get the same code if you use random encodes with same commands, And that make OWASP-ZSC one of the best! During the Google Summer of Code we are working on to generate Windows Shellcode and new obfuscation methods. We are working on the next version that will allow you to generate OSX.

OWASP-ZSC Installation:
   You must install Metasploit and Python 2 or 3 first:

• For Debian-based distro users: sudo apt install python2 python3 metasploit-framework
• For Arch Linux based distro users: sudo pacman -S python2 python3 metasploit
• For Windows users: Download Python and Metasploit here.

   And then, enter these command (If you're Windows user, don't enter sudo):
DISCLAIMER: THIS SOFTWARE WAS CREATED TO CHALLENGE ANTIVIRUS TECHNOLOGY, RESEARCH NEW ENCRYPTION METHODS, AND PROTECT SENSITIVE OPEN SOURCE FILES WHICH INCLUDE IMPORTANT DATA. CONTRIBUTORS AND OWASP FOUNDATION WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY ILLEGAL USAGE.

An example of OWASP-ZSC

Download OWASP-ZSC

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Playing With TLS-Attacker

In the last two years, we changed the TLS-Attacker Project quite a lot but kept silent about most changes we implemented. Since we do not have so much time to keep up with the documentation (we are researchers and not developers in the end), we thought about creating a small series on some of our recent changes to the project on this blog.

We hope this gives you an idea on how to use the most recent version (TLS-Attacker 2.8). If you feel like you found a bug, don't hesitate to contact me via GitHub/Mail/Twitter. This post assumes that you have some idea what this is all about. If you have no idea, checkout the original paper from Juraj or our project on GitHub.

TLDR: TLS-Attacker is a framework which allows you to send arbitrary protocol flows.


Quickstart:
# Install & Use Java JDK 8
$ sudo apt-get install maven
$ git clone https://github.com/RUB-NDS/TLS-Attacker
$ cd TLS-Attacker
$ mvn clean package

So, what changed since the release of the original paper in 2016? Quite a lot! We discovered that we could make the framework much more powerful by adding some new concepts to the code which I want to show you now.

Action System

In the first Version of TLS-Attacker (1.x), WorkflowTraces looked like this:
Although this design looks straight forward, it lacks flexibility. In this design, a WorkflowTrace is basically a list of messages. Each message is annotated with a <messageIssuer>, to tell TLS-Attacker that it should either try to receive this message or send it itself. If you now want to support more advanced workflows, for example for renegotiation or session resumption, TLS-Attacker will soon reach its limits. There is also a missing angle for fuzzing purposes. TLS-Attacker will by default try to use the correct parameters for the message creation, and then apply the modifications afterward. But what if we want to manipulate parameters of the connection which influence the creation of messages? This was not possible in the old version, therefore, we created our action system. With this action system, a WorkflowTrace does not only consist of a list of messages but a list of actions. The most basic actions are the Send- and ReceiveAction. These actions allow you to basically recreate the previous behavior of TLS-Attacker 1.x . Here is an example to show how the same workflow would look like in the newest TLS-Attacker version:


As you can see, the <messageIssuer> tags are gone. Instead, you now indicate with the type of action how you want to deal with the message. Another important thing: TLS-Attacker uses WorkflowTraces as an input as well as an output format. In the old version, once a WorkflowTrace was executed it was hard to see what actually happened. Especially, if you specify what messages you expect to receive. In the old version, your WorkflowTrace could change during execution. This was very confusing and we, therefore, changed the way the receiving of messages works. The ReceiveAction has a list of <expectedMessages>. You can specify what you expect the other party to do. This is mostly interesting for performance tricks (more on that in another post), but can also be used to validate that your workflow executedAsPlanned. Once you execute your ReceiveAction an additional <messages> tag will pop up in the ReceiveAction to show you what has actually been observed. Your original WorkflowTrace stays intact.


During the execution, TLS-Attacker will execute the actions one after the other. There are specific configuration options with which you can control what TLS-Attacker should do in the case of an error. By default, TLS-Attacker will never stop, and just execute whatever is next.

Configs

As you might have seen the <messageIssuer> tags are not the only thing which is missing. Additionally, the cipher suites, compression algorithms, point formats, and supported curves are missing. This is no coincidence. A big change in TLS-Attacker 2.x is the separation of the WorkflowTrace from the parameter configuration and the context. To explain how this works I have to talk about how the new TLS-Attacker version creates messages. Per default, the WorkflowTrace does not contain the actual contents of the messages. But let us step into TLS-Attackers point of view. For example, what should TLS-Attacker do with the following WorkflowTrace:

Usually, the RSAClientKeyExchange message is constructed with the public key from the received certificate message. But in this WorkflowTrace, we did not receive a certificate message yet. So what public key are we supposed to use? The previous version had "some" key hardcoded. The new version does not have these default values hardcoded but allows you as the user to define the default values for missing values, or how our own messages should be created. For this purpose, we introduced the new concept of Configs. A Config is a file/class which you can provide to TLS-Attacker in addition to a WorkflowTrace, to define how TLS-Attacker should behave, and how TLS-Attacker should create its messages (even in the absence of needed parameters). For this purpose, TLS-Attacker has a default Config, with all the known hardcoded values. It is basically a long list of possible parameters and configuration options. We chose sane values for most things, but you might have other ideas on how to do things. You can execute a WorkflowTrace with a specific config. The provided Config will then overwrite all existing default values with your specified values. If you do not specify a certain value, the default value will be used. I will get back to how Configs work, once we played a little bit with TLS-Attacker.

TLS-Attacker ships with a few example applications (found in the "apps/" folder after you built the project). While TLS-Attacker 1.x was mostly a standalone tool, we currently see TLS-Attacker more as a library which we can use by our more sophisticated projects. The current example applications are:

• TLS-Client (A TLS-Client to execute WorkflowTraces with)
• TLS-Server (A TLS-Server to execute WorkflowTraces with)
• Attacks (We'll talk about this in another blog post)
• TLS-Forensics (We'll talk about this in another blog post)
• TLS-Mitm (We'll talk about this in another blog post)
• TraceTool (We'll talk about this in another blog post) 

TLS-Client

The TLS-Client is a simple TLS-Client. Per default, it executes a handshake for the default selected cipher suite (RSA). The only mandatory parameter is the server you want to connect to (-connect).

The most trivial command you can start it with is:

Note: The example tool does not like "https://" or other protocol information. Just provide a hostname and port

Depending on the host you chose your output might look like this:

or like this:

So what is going on here? Let's start with the first execution. As I already mentioned. TLS-Attacker constructs the default WorkflowTrace based on the default selected cipher suite. When you run the client, the WorkflowExecutor (part of TLS-Attacker which is responsible for the execution of a WorkflowTrace) will try to execute the handshake. For this purpose, it will first start the TCP connection.
This is what you see here:

After that, it will execute the actions specified in the default WorkflowTrace. The default WorkflowTrace looks something like this:
This is basically what you see in the console output. The first action which gets executed is the SendAction with the ClientHello.

Then, we expect to receive messages. Since we want to be an RSA handshake, we do not expect a ServerKeyExchange message, but only want a ServerHello, Certificate and a ServerHelloDone message.

We then execute the second SendAction:

and finally, we want to receive a ChangeCipherSpec and Finished Message:

In the first execution, these steps all seem to have worked. But why did they fail in the second execution? The reason is that our default Config does not only allow specify RSA cipher suites but creates ClientHello messages which also contain elliptic curve cipher suites. Depending on the server you are testing with, the server will either select and RSA cipher suite, or an elliptic curve one. This means, that the WorkflowTrace will not executeAsPlanned. The server will send an additional ECDHEServerKeyExchange. If we would look at the details of the ServerHello message we would also see that an (ephemeral) elliptic curve cipher suite is selected:

Since our WorkflowTrace is configured to send an RSAClientKeyExchange message next, it will just do that:

Note: ClientKeyExchangeMessage all have the same type field, but are implemented inside of TLS-Attacker as different messages

Since this RSAClientKeyExchange does not make a lot of sense for the server, it rejects this message with a DECODE_ERROR alert:

If we would change the Config of TLS-Attacker, we could change the way our ClientHello is constructed. If we specify only RSA cipher suites, the server has no choice but to select an RSA one (or immediately terminate the connection). We added command line flags for the most common Config changes. Let's try to change the default cipher suite to TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:

As you can see, we now executed a complete ephemeral elliptic curve handshake. This is, because the -cipher flag changed the <defaultSelectedCiphersuite> parameter (among others) in the Config. Based on this parameter the default WorkflowTrace is constructed. If you want, you can specify multiple cipher suites at once, by seperating them with a comma.

We can do the same change by supplying TLS-Attacker with a custom Config via XML. To this we need to create a new file (I will name it config.xml) like this:

You can then load the Config with the -config flag:

For a complete reference of the supported Config options, you can check out the default_config.xml. Most Config options should be self-explanatory, for others, you might want to check where and how they are used in the code (sorry).

Now let's try to execute an arbitrary WorkflowTrace. To do this, we need to store our WorkflowTrace in a file and load it with the -workflow_input parameter. I just created the following WorkflowTrace:


As you can see I just send a ServerHello message instead of a ClientHello message at the beginning of the handshake. This should obviously never happen but let's see how the tested server reacts to this.
We can execute the workflow with the following command:

The server (correctly) responded with an UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE alert. Great!

Output parameters & Modifications

You are now familiar with the most basic concepts of TLS-Attacker, so let's dive into other things TLS-Attacker can do for you. As a TLS-Attacker user, you are sometimes interested in the actual values which are used during a WorkflowTrace execution. For this purpose, we introduced the -workflow_output flag. With this parameter, you can ask TLS-Attacker to store the executed WorkflowTrace with all its values in a file.
Let's try to execute our last created WorkflowTrace, and store the output WorkflowTrace in the file out.xml:


The resulting WorkflowTrace looks like this:

As you can see, although the input WorkflowTrace was very short, the output trace is quite noisy. TLS-Attacker will display all its intermediate values and modification points (this is where the modifiable variable concept becomes interesting). You can also execute the output workflow again.


Note that at this point there is a common misunderstanding: TLS-Attacker will reset the WorkflowTrace before it executes it again. This means, it will delete all intermediate values you see in the WorkflowTrace and recompute them dynamically. This means that if you change a value within <originalValue> tags, your changes will just be ignored. If you want to influence the values TLS-Attacker uses, you either have to manipulate the Config (as already shown) or apply modifications to TLS-Attackers ModifiableVariables. The concept of ModifiableVariables is mostly unchanged to the previous version, but we will show you how to do this real quick anyway.

So let us imagine we want to manipulate a value in the WorkflowTrace using a ModifiableVariable via XML. First, we have to select a field which we want to manipulate. I will choose the protocol version field in the ServerHello message we sent. In the WorkflowTrace this looked like this:

For historical reasons, 0x0303 means TLS 1.2. 0x0300 was SSL 3. When they introduced TLS 1.0 they chose 0x0301 and since then they just upgraded the minor version.

In order to manipulate this ModifiableVariable, we first need to know its type. In some cases it is currently non-trivial to determine the exact type, this is mostly undocumented (sorry). If you don't know the exact type of a field you currently have to look at the code. The following types and modifications are defined:

• ModifiableBigInteger: add, explicitValue, shiftLeft, shiftRight, subtract, xor
• ModifiableBoolean: explicitValue, toggle
• ModifiableByteArray: delete, duplicate, explicitValue, insert, shuffle, xor
• ModifiableInteger: add, explicitValue, shiftLeft, shiftRight, subtract, xor
• ModifiableLong: add, explicitValue, subtract, xor
• ModifiableByte: add, explicitValue, subtract, xor
• ModifiableString: explicitValue

As a rule of thumb: If the value is only up to 1 byte of length we use a ModifiableByte. If the value is up to 4 bytes of length, but the values are used as a normal number (for example in length fields) it is a ModifiableInteger. Fields which are used as a number which are bigger than 4 bytes (for example a modulus) is usually a ModifiableBigInteger. Most other types are encoded as ModifiableByteArrays. The other types are very rare (we are currently working on making this whole process more transparent).
Once you have found your type you have to select a modification to apply to it. For manual analysis, the most common modifications are the XOR modification and the explicit value modification. However, during fuzzing other modifications might be useful as well. Often times you just want to flip a bit and see how the server responds, or you want to directly overwrite a value. In this example, we want to overwrite a value.
Let us force TLS-Attacker to send the version 0x3A3A. To do this I consult the ModifiableVariable README.md for the exact syntax. Since <protocolVersion> is a ModifiableByteArray I search in the ByteArray section.

I find the following snippet:

If I now want to change the value to 0x3A3A I modify my WorkflowTrace like this:

You can then execute the WorkflowTrace with:

With Wireshark you can now observe  that the protocol version got actually changed. You would also see the change if you would specify a -workflow_output or if you start the TLS-Client with the -debug flag.

More Actions

As I already hinted, TLS-Attacker has more actions to offer than just a basic Send- and ReceiveAction (50+ in total). The most useful, and easiest to understand actions are now introduced:

ActivateEncryptionAction

This action does basically what the CCS message does. It activates the currently "negotiated" parameters. If necessary values are missing in the context of the connection, they are drawn from the Config.

DeactivateEncryptionAction

This action does the opposite. If the encryption was active, we now send unencrypted again.

PrintLastHandledApplicationDataAction

Prints the last application data message either sent or received.

PrintProposedExtensionsAction

Prints the proposed extensions (from the client)

PrintSecretsAction

Prints the secrets (RSA) from the current connection. This includes the nonces, cipher suite, public key, modulus, premaster secret, master secret and verify data.

RenegotiationAction

Resets the message digest. This is usually done if you want to perform a renegotiation.

ResetConnectionAction

Closes and reopens the connection. This can be useful if you want to analyze session resumption or similar things which involve more than one handshake.

SendDynamicClientKeyExchangeAction

Send a ClientKeyExchange message, and always chooses the correct one (depending on the current connection state). This is useful if you just don't care about the actual cipher suite and just want the handshake done.

SendDynamicServerKeyExchangeAction

(Maybe) sends a ServerKeyExchange message. This depends on the currently selected cipher suite. If the cipher suite requires the transmission of a ServerKeyExchange message, then a ServerKeyExchange message will be sent, otherwise, nothing is done. This is useful if you just don't care about the actual cipher suite and just want the handshake done.

WaitAction

This lets TLS-Attacker sleep for a specified amount of time (in ms).

As you might have already seen there is so much more to talk about in TLS-Attacker. But this should give you a rough idea of what is going on.

If you have any research ideas or need support feel free to contact us on Twitter (@ic0nz1, @jurajsomorovsky ) or at https://www.hackmanit.de/.

If TLS-Attacker helps you to find a bug in a TLS implementation, please acknowledge our tool(s). If you want to learn more about TLS, Juraj and I are also giving a Training about TLS at Ruhrsec (27.05.2019).

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System Hacking: Password Cracking Techniques And Types Of Passwords

This blog based on two major concepts:

• Understand password-cracking techniques
• Understand different types of passwords
 

The simplest way to crack the passwords

The first step is to access the system is that you should know how to crack the password of the target system. Passwords are the key element of information require to access the system, and users also selects passwords that are easy to guess such as mostly people has a passwords of their pet's name or room number etc to help them remember it. Because of this human factor, most password guessing is successful if some information is known about the target. Information gathering and reconnaissance can help give away information that will help a hacker guess a user's password.

Once a password is guessed or cracked, it can be the launching point for escalating privileges, executing applications, hiding files, and covering tracks. If guessing a password fails, then passwords may be cracked manually or with automated tools such as a dictionary or brute-force method.

Types of Passwords 

• Only numbers
• Only letters
• Only special characters
• Letters and numbers
• Only letters and special characters 
• Numbers, letters and special characters

A strong password is less susceptible to attack by a hacker. The following rules, proposed by the EC-Council, should be applied when you're creating a password, to protect it against attacks:

• Must not contain any part of the user's account name
• Must have a minimum of eight characters
• Must contain characters from at least three of the following categories:
  • Non alphanumeric symbols ($,:"%@!#)
  • Numbers
  • Uppercase letters
  • Lowercase letters

A hacker may use different types of attacks in order to identify a password and gain further access to a system. The types of password attacks are as follows:

Passive Online

​Eavesdropping on network password exchanges. Passive online attacks
include sniffing, man-in-the-middle, and replay attacks. Moreover, a passive online attack is also known as sniffing the password on a wired or wireless network. A passive attack is not detectable to the end user. The password is captured during the authentication process and can then be compared against a dictionary file or word list. User account passwords are commonly hashed or encrypted when sent on the network to prevent unauthorized access and use. If the password is protected by encryption or hashing, special tools in the hacker's toolkit can be used to break the algorithm.

Another passive online attack is known as man-in-the-middle (MITM). In a MITM attack, the hacker intercepts the authentication request and forwards it to the server. By inserting a sniffer between the client and the server, the hacker is able to sniff both connections and capture passwords in the process.

A replay attack is also a passive online attack; it occurs when the hacker intercepts the password en route to the authentication server and then captures and resend the authentication packets for later authentication. In this manner, the hacker doesn't have to break the password or learn the password through MITM but rather captures the password and reuses the password-authentication packets later to authenticate as the client.

Active Online

Guessing the Administrator password. Active online attacks include auto-
mated password guessing. Moreover, The easiest way to gain administrator-level access to a system is to guess a simple password assuming the administrator used a simple password. Password guessing is an active online attack. It relies on the human factor involved in password creation and only works on weak
passwords.

Assuming that the NetBIOS TCP 139 port is open, the most effective method of breaking into a Windows NT or Windows 2000 system is password guessing. This is done by attempting to connect to an enumerated share ( IPC$ or C$ ) and trying a username and password combination. The most commonly used Administrator account and password combinations are words like Admin, Administrator, Sysadmin, or Password, or a null password.
A hacker may first try to connect to a default Admin$ , C$ , or C:\Windows share. To connect to the hidden C: drive share, for example, type the following command in the Run field (Start ➪ Run):

\\ip_address\c$

Automated programs can quickly generate dictionary files, word lists, or every possible combination of letters, numbers, and special characters and then attempt to log on using those credentials. Most systems prevent this type of attack by setting a maximum number of login attempts on a system before the account is locked.

In the following sections, we'll discuss how hackers can perform automated password guessing more closely, as well as countermeasures to such attacks.

Performing Automated Password Guessing

To speed up the guessing of a password, hackers use automated tools. An easy process for automating password guessing is to use the Windows shell commands based on the standard NET USE syntax. To create a simple automated password-guessing script, perform the following steps:

1. Create a simple username and password file using Windows Notepad. Automated tools such as the Dictionary Generator are available to create this word list. Save the file on the C: drive as credentials.txt.
2. Pipe this file using the FOR command: C:\> FOR /F "token=1, 2*" %i in (credentials.txt)
3. Type net use \\targetIP\IPC$ %i /u: %j to use the credentials.txt file to attempt to log on to the target system's hidden share.

Offline Attacks

Offline attacks are performed from a location other than the actual computer where the passwords reside or were used. Offline attacks usually require physical access to the computer and copying the password file from the system onto removable media. The hacker then takes the file to another computer to perform the cracking. Several types of offline password attacks exist.

Types of Attack	Characteristics	Password Example
Dictionary attack	Attempts to use passwords from a list of dictionary words	Administrator
Hybrid attack	Substitutes numbers of symbols for password characters	Adm1n1strator
Brute-force attack	Tries all possible combinations of letters, numbers, and special characters	Ms!tr245@F5a

A dictionary attack is the simplest and quickest type of attack. It's used to identify a password that is an actual word, which can be found in a dictionary. Most commonly, the attack uses a dictionary file of possible words, which is hashed using the same algorithm used by the authentication process. Then, the hashed dictionary words are compared with hashed passwords as the user logs on, or with passwords stored in a file on the server. The dictionary attack works only if the password is an actual dictionary word; therefore, this type of attack has some limitations. It can't be used against strong passwords containing numbers or other symbols.

A hybrid attack is the next level of attack a hacker attempts if the password can't be found using a dictionary attack. The hybrid attack starts with a dictionary file and substitutes numbers and symbols for characters in the password. For example, many users add the number 1 to the end of their password to meet strong password requirements. A hybrid attack is designed to find those types of anomalies in passwords.

The most time-consuming type of attack is a brute-force attack, which tries every possible combination of uppercase and lowercase letters, numbers, and symbols. A brute-force attack is the slowest of the three types of attacks because of the many possible combinations of characters in the password. However, brute force is effective; given enough time and processing power, all passwords can eventually be identified.

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OWASP May Connector 2019

*|MC_PREVIEW_TEXT|*

OWASP Connector May 2019 Communications | Projects | Events | Community | Membership COMMUNICATIONS Letter from the Vice Chairman: Dear OWASP Community, Since last month the foundation has been busy working towards enabling our project leaders and community members to utilize funds to work on nurturing and developing projects. So far there has been huge uptake on this initiative. It's great to see so many people passionate about collaborating at project summits.    Our Global AppSec Tel-Aviv is nearly upon us, for members, there is an extra incentive for attending this conference, in the form of a significant discount. This and the sandy beaches and beautiful scenery, not to mention the great speakers and trainers we have lined up, is a great reason to attend. If you have not done so we would encourage you to attend this great conference - https://telaviv.appsecglobal.org.   One of the key things I've noticed in my Board of Director tenure is the passion our community emits, sometimes this passion aids in growing the foundation, but sometimes it also forces us to take a step back and look at how we do things within the foundation. With Mike, our ED and staff we have seen a lot of good change from an operations perspective, with more in the pipeline. Mike's appointment has allowed the Board of Directors to take a step back from operations and enable us to work on more strategic goals. To this end at a recent Board meeting we discussed each Board member taking up one of the following strategic goals, as set out at the start of the year:   1.Marketing the OWASP brand  2.Membership benefits 3.Developer outreach Improve benefits  Decrease the possibility of OWASP losing relevance Reaching out to management and Risk levels Increase involvement in new tech/ ways of doing things – dev ops   4.Project focus  Get Universities involved Practicum sponsored ideas Internships    5.Improve finances 6.Improve OWAP/ Board of Directors Perception 7.Process improvement 8. Get consistent ED 9.Community empowerment   I would encourage the community to come forward if you have any ideas on the above and are happy to work with one of the 7 Board of Directors and community members on one of these initiatives.    Thanks and best wishes,  Owen Pendlebury Vice Chair OWASP FOUNDATION UPDATE FROM INTERIM EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: OWASP Foundation welcomes aboard Emily Berman as Events Director. Emily was most recently with the Scrum Alliance where she planned high-profile functions for upwards of 2,000 guests. Emily brings a fresh approach to events planning and her 12 years of experience planning and organizing large-scale events worldwide well in advance will greatly benefit our Global AppSecs. Did you Register yet?  Global AppSec DC September 9-13, 2019 submit to the Call for Papers and Call for Training Check out Sponsorship Opportunities while they are still available. Save the Date for Global AppSec Amsterdam Sept 23-27, 2019  Sponsorship Opportunities are available EVENTS  You may also be interested in one of our other affiliated events: REGIONAL AND LOCAL EVENTS Event Date Location Latam Tour 2019 Starting April 4, 2019 Latin America OWASP Portland Training Day September 25, 2019 Portland, OR OWASP Italy Day Udine 2019 September 27,2019 Udine, Italy OWASP Portland Day October 16,2019 Wroclaw, Poland LASCON X October 24-25,2019 Austin, TX OWASP AppSec Day 2019 Oct 30 - Nov 1, 2019 Melbourne, Australia PARTNER AND PROMOTIONAL EVENTS Event Date Location Open Security Summit June 3-7,2019 Woburn Forest Center Parcs, Bedfordshire Hack in Paris 2019 June 16-20, 2019 Paris Cyber Security and Cloud Expo Europe June 19-20, 2019 Amsterdam IoT Tech Expo Europe June 19-20, 2019 Amsterdam BlackHat USA 2019 August 3-8,2019 Las Vegas, Nevada DefCon 27 August 8-11,2019 Las Vegas, Nevada it-sa-IT Security Expo and Congress October 8-10, 2019 Germany PROJECTS We have had the following projects added to the OWASP inventory.  Please congratulate these leaders and check out the work they have done: Project Type Leader(s) Risk Assessment Framework Documentation Ade Yoseman Putra, Rejah Rehim QRLJacker Tool Mohammed Baset Container Security Verification Standard Documentation Sven Vetsch Find Security Bugs Code Philippe Arteau Vulnerable Web Application Code Fatih Çelik D4N155 Tool Julio Pedro de Lira Neto Jupiter Tool Matt Stanchek Top 10 Card Game Documentation Dennis Johnson Samurai WTF Code Kevin Johnson DevSecOps Maturity Model Documentation Timo Pagel   Also, we will have the following projects presenting at the Project Showcase Global AppSec Tel Aviv: Final Schedule Wednesday, May 29th Thursday, May 30th Time Project Presenter(s) Confirmed Time Project Presenter(s) Confirmed 10:​4​5 a.m. Glue Tool Omer Levi Hevroni Yes 10:​30 ​ a.m. API Security Erez Yalon, Inon Shkedy Yes   ​7                     11:5​5​ a.m. IoT & Embedded AppSec Aaron Guzman Yes 11:​50​ a.m. Mod Security Core Rule Set Tin Zaw Yes         12:​25 ​p.m. Automated Threats Tin Zaw Yes 12:​30 ​p.m. Lunch Break   12:​55​ p.m. Lunch Break   2:​35​ p.m. SAMM John DiLeo Yes         ​3:10​ p.m. Application Security Curriculum John DiLeo Yes ​3:10 p.m. ​Damned Vulnerable Serveless Application​ ​Tal Melamed​ ​Yes​   Finally, if you are able to help participate in the Project Reviews at the Conference, please send me an email at harold.blankenship@owasp.com.  We have a large line-up of projects to review this time around: Project To Level Leader(s) Snakes and Ladders Flagship Katy Anton, Colin Watson Cheat Sheet Series Flagship Dominique Righetto, Jim Manico Mobile Security Testing Guide Flagship Jeroen Willemsen, Sven Schleier Amass Lab Jeff Foley Attack Surface Detector Lab Ken Prole SecureTea Lab Ade Yoseman Putra, Bambang Rahmadi K.P, Rejah Rehim.A.A Serverless Goat Lab Ory Segal Google Summer of Code Update: We were allocated 13 students this year!  The current timeline is as follows: Google Season of Docs: We were accepted into the Google Season of Docs.  There will be a single technical writer resource.  The current timeline is as follows: COMMUNITY New OWASP Chapters Riyadh, Saudi Arabia Guayaquil, Equador Lome, Togo Natal, Brazil Nashua, New Hampshire Gwalior, India Louisville, Kentucky Nainital, India Liverpool, United Kingdom Syracuse, New York MEMBERSHIP   We would like to welcome the following Premier and Contributor Corporate Members. Premier Corporate Members Contributor Corporate Members Join us Donate Our mailing address is: OWASP Foundation  1200-C Agora Drive, # 232 Bel Air, MD 21014   Contact Us Unsubscribe

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